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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court committed fundamental error by instructing the jury that Joshua Alberts
could not claim self-defense if he intentionally put himself where he knew or believed he would
have to act in self-defense. In response, the State has asserted that this issue is not properly
before this Court and that Mr. Alberts has failed to show fundamental error. Those arguments
are unavailing. The State’s attempts to bar this Court from reaching the merits of this issue rest
on its misunderstanding of the fundamental error and invited error doctrines and would require
this Court to depart from well-established Idaho appellate court precedent. As for the merits, the
State is unable to square the instruction at issue with Idaho Code, Idaho case law, or the common
law.

Because the instruction amounted to fundamental error, this Court should vacate

Mr. Alberts’ judgment of conviction and remand this case to the district court for a new trial.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court commit fundamental error when it instructed the jury that Mr. Alberts could
not have acted in self-defense if he intentionally put himself in a situation where he knew or
believed he would have to act in self-defense?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Instructed The Jury That
Mr. Alberts Could Not Have Acted In Self-Defense If He Intentionally Put Himself In A
Situation Where He Knew Or Believed He Would Have To Act In Self-Defense

A.

Introduction
The district court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury that

Mr. Alberts could not claim self-defense if he intentionally put himself in a situation where he
knew or believed he would have to invoke its aid, and the State’s arguments to the contrary are
without merit. First, the State’s novel suggestions that an instruction which was objected to on
other grounds below cannot be raised as fundamental error, and relatedly that an instruction
which was requested by the State, but objected to and revised at the defendant’s request, is
invited error, misunderstand the fundamental error and invited error doctrines and conflict with
the Idaho Supreme Court’s precedents. Second, the State’s assertion that Mr. Alberts has failed
to show fundamental error rests on its faulty explanation of the interaction between the Idaho
Code and the common law, its mistaken belief that the instruction is consistent with the common
law, and its misapplication of this Court’s precedents. Because the instruction amounts to
fundamental error, this Court should vacate Mr. Alberts’ conviction and remand this case to the
district court for a new trial.

B.

Because Mr. Alberts Has Properly Raised This Issue, This Court Should Reach Its Merits
The State has asserted two procedural bars to Mr. Alberts’ argument that the district court

committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury that Mr. Alberts could not claim selfdefense if he intentionally put himself in a situation where he knew or believed he would have to
invoke its aid. To begin, the State claims that “there was no unobjected-to error because Alberts
actually objected to the jury instructions on different grounds below; Alberts therefore fails, as a
3

threshold matter, to show that his claim can be analyzed for fundamental error.” (Resp. Br., p.12
(formatting altered).) This argument ignores numerous cases from the Idaho appellate courts,
including State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 214 (2010), rests on an incorrectly-decided Court of
Appeals case, State v. Briggs, 162 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 2017),1 and provides no principled reason
for this Court to create a third category of cases in which defense counsel’s objection on other
grounds precludes this Court from reviewing an unobjected-to constitutional error. Next, the
State argues that Mr. Alberts invited the error because, even though the State requested the selfdefense instruction and Mr. Alberts objected to it, he eventually conceded (mistakenly so) that
the instruction correctly stated the law. (Resp. Br., pp.16–17.) This argument relies on an
incomplete account of what took place below and would require an unprecedented extension of
the invited error doctrine. The State’s attempts to preclude this Court from reaching the merits
of Mr. Alberts’ claim are thus meritless.

1.

Mr. Alberts’ Claim Is Properly Reviewed As Fundamental Error

Contrary to the State’s assertion, Mr. Albert properly challenged the self-defense
instruction as fundamental error, regardless of the fact that he objected to the instruction at issue
on other grounds. In Perry, the Supreme Court recounted the history of the then-existing
standards of review for preserved and unpreserved errors, and then articulated the standards
applicable to all alleged errors from then on. It held:
[W]here a defendant alleges that an error occurred at trial, appellate courts
in Idaho will engage in the following analysis:
(1) If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at
trial, appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman.
Where the defendant meets his initial burden of showing that a violation occurred,
1

Although the State does not cite it, the Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in State v.
Diaz, 163 Idaho 165 (2017).
4

the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a
reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's
verdict. There are two exceptions to this standard:
a. Where the error in question is a constitutional violation found to
constitute a structural defect, affecting the base structure of the trial to the point
that a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence, the appellate court shall automatically vacate
and remand.
b. Where the jury reached its verdict based upon erroneous instruction an
appellate court shall generally vacate and remand the decision of the lower court.
However, in the limited instance where the jury received proper instruction on all
but one element of an offense, and “[w]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.”
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79 (2004). If a rational jury could have found that
the state failed to prove the omitted element then the appellate court shall vacate
and remand.
(2) If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection,
it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s fundamental error
doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears
the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one
or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision); and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate
court that the complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the
appellate court shall vacate and remand.
We find that this analytical approach clarifies our standard of review while
adhering to the historic principles underlying Idaho’s harmless error and
fundamental error doctrines.
150 Idaho at 227–28 (internal citation omitted). Conspicuously absent from this comprehensive
proclamation is any mention of the State’s newly-minted third category of claims in which
defense counsel’s unsuccessful objection on other grounds below bars review of a defendant’s
unpreserved constitutional claim. To be sure, post-Perry, both the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals have analyzed claims under fundamental error when a defendant objected to the
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district court’s ruling on other grounds. See, e.g., State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 221 (2014) (in
which Easley objected to “the process conferring on the Twin Falls County prosecutor the ability
to prevent the district court from considering her for mental health court” below, argued for the
first time on appeal that the prosecutorial veto violates Idaho’s separation of powers doctrine and
thus amounts to fundamental error, and the Court agreed); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 446–
50 (2012) (in which Adamcik objected to jury instructions 14 and 15 on other grounds below,
challenged those two instructions as fundamental error on appeal, and the Court decided the
merits of Adamcik’s fundamental error claim); State v. Riggins, 160 Idaho 723, 724 (Ct. App.
2016) (in which “Riggins objected to the motion to reconsider, but not on the grounds advanced
on appeal,” he argued on appeal “that the district court’s reconsideration and reversal of its order
granting withdrawal of his guilty plea was fundamental error,” and the Court of Appeals
analyzed his fundamental error claim); State v. Conner, 161 Idaho 502, 504–06 (Ct. App. 2016)
(in which Conner sought to admit statements under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) and 803(24),
he argued for the first time on appeal that the district court’s decision to exclude those statements
violated his constitutional right to present a defense, and the Court of Appeals addressed that
constitutional claim under fundamental error).
Overlooking this Court’s clear articulation of these standards of review in Perry, the State
relies on Briggs to argue that an unpreserved constitutional violation is unreviewable under the
fundamental error doctrine if defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling on other grounds.
(Resp. Br., pp.12–15.) Briggs is inconsistent with Perry, its logic is flawed, and it was thus
wrongly decided.
In Briggs, the defendant sought to admit evidence of his alleged victims’ sexual histories
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 412, in order to show the victims’ motive to lie.
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Briggs,

162 Idaho at 738. The district court excluded the evidence, concluding that it was inadmissible
under Rule 412. Id. On appeal, Briggs argued that the district court committed fundamental
error by excluding the evidence in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him. Id. at 740. The Court of Appeals held that, because there was no
unobjected-to error, Briggs could not raise his claim as fundamental error. Id. at 739. It
explained:
It is not unobjected-to error when a party articulates a specific basis to
admit evidence, receives a ruling, and then fails to offer a different basis on which
to admit the evidence. . . .
Here, the actions of Briggs’s trial attorney did not qualify as unobjected-to
error. Trial counsel filed a motion in limine, arguing a very specific ground on
which the district court should admit evidence of the victims’ sexual history,
which the district court denied. When the evidence was excluded, trial counsel
did not offer a different basis for its admission. Thus, this is not a case where trial
counsel failed to object; instead, this is a case where trial counsel failed to offer a
basis upon which the evidence could be admitted. Briggs’s claim on appeal is not
that the State or the district court made an error to which no objection was made.
Rather, Briggs is claiming his attorney failed to argue a particular basis on which
to admit the evidence, thus constituting “unobjected-to error.” Here, however,
there was no error to which trial counsel could object because he could not object
to his own inaction. This is not the type of circumstance of “unobjected-to error”
contemplated by the Perry opinion. The failure to offer a specific evidence rule
as a basis to admit or exclude evidence is not unobjected-to error for purposes of a
fundamental error analysis.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although Briggs appears to superficially distinguish itself from Perry by explaining that
Briggs’s attorney failed to provide the basis to admit the evidence, the Briggs Court overlooked
that the end result is the same: Whether the district court excludes evidence, admits evidence, or
makes any other ruling, a ruling which violates a defendant’s constitutional rights is reviewable
under the fundamental error doctrine. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227–28. Contrary to Briggs’
reasoning, then, the error that went unobjected-to in Briggs was not defense counsel’s “own
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inaction”—that could be said in any case, as defense counsel’s failure to raise the grounds
asserted on appeal is a necessary precursor to fundamental error review. Briggs, 162 Idaho at
739.

Instead, the error was the violation of Briggs’ constitutional rights in excluding the

evidence.

Such a ruling is reviewable as fundamental error regardless of whether defense

counsel argues against that ruling on some other grounds.
Finally, the State has offered no principled reason why claims in which no objection was
made are reviewable under fundamental error, while claims in which an objection was made,
albeit on other grounds, are unreviewable. And for good reason—there is none. Recognizing
that “every defendant has a Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and it is axiomatic that a
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,” the fundamental error doctrine
serves as an exception to the general rule that Idaho appellate courts will not consider arguments
made for the first time on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224 (internal citations, quotation marks,
and alterations omitted); see also State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420–21 (2012) (“As a
general rule, we will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. When the alleged
error constitutes a fundamental error, however, review on appeal is permissible.”) (quoting
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715–16 (2009)). Therefore, when a defendant is deprived of a
constitutional right at trial, he is entitled to appellate review of that violation, regardless of
whether he preserved the issue and regardless of whether he objected on some other grounds.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 222, 227–28. The State’s suggestion that defense counsel can deprive a
defendant of appellate review of the most important types of claims—those involving his
constitutional rights—by objecting on other grounds flies in the face of the reasoning behind the
fundamental error doctrine.
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This Court should flatly reject the State’s invitation to revisit this Court’s pronouncement
of the various standards of review in Perry and create a third category of constitutional violations
which Idaho’s appellate courts have no authority to review simply because defense counsel
objected to the ruling on other grounds. Mr. Alberts properly challenged the instruction as
fundamental error.

2.

Mr. Alberts Did Not Invite The Erroneous Instruction

The State contends that “[i]f Jury Instruction 29 contained any errors they were plainly
invited by Alberts” because Mr. Alberts “was instrumental in helping modify the instruction”
and eventually conceded that the modified instruction correctly stated the law.

(Resp.

Br., pp.16–18.) The State is wrong.
First, the State’s analysis omits a large portion of the parties’ discussion about this
instruction, instead focusing only on defense counsel’s eventual concession that the instruction,
as modified by the court, correctly stated the law. (Resp. Br., pp.16–17.) To be clear, the State
requested the instruction and defense counsel objected to it on various grounds. (Tr., p.1100,
L.25–p.1102, L.13.) Defense counsel said “it’s not ICJI,” it “seems to be somewhat superfluous
to some of the other instructions,” and “it can confuse the issue of where the burden of proof is
placed,” and thus incorrectly stated the law. (Tr., p.1100, L.25–p.1102, L.13.) After the court
modified the instruction to address defense counsel’s concern that it misstated the law with
respect to the burden of proof, the court said: “the parties have preserved their objections
already lodged on the record—any additional objections or concerns?” and defense counsel
responded, “[w]e’ll defer to the Court, Your Honor.” (Tr., p.1102, L.14–p.1107, L.15.) But then
co-counsel interrupted, saying that part of the proposed instruction—which said that “[t]he
circumstances justifying a homicide must be such as to render it unavoidable”—conflicted with
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the other self-defense instructions. (Tr., p.1107, L.16–p.1108, L.15.) The Court deleted that
phrase from the instruction, read the instruction into the record “so everyone knows what it will
say,” and moved on. (Tr., p.1108, L.16–p.1111, L.19.) In short, by conceding that the modified
instruction correctly stated the law, defense counsel did not waive his other objections to the
instruction, nor did he turn an about-face and say that he actually wanted the court to give the
modified instruction.
Second, the State’s suggestion that a party invites an erroneous jury instruction under
these circumstances is unprecedented. “The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a
party who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court to give or not give an
instruction from later challenging that decision on appeal.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240
(1999). Therefore, the invited error doctrine bars a party from challenging an instruction on
appeal when the party specifically requested the instruction below. State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho
221, 232 (2014) (holding that “[w]here the error is the giving of a jury instruction proposed by
the defendant, that matter should be resolved in post-conviction relief proceedings”) (emphasis
added). On the other hand, a party’s failure to object to an instruction, even when the court
explicitly asks if there are any objections, does not amount to invited error. Blake, 133 Idaho at
240 (in which defense counsel stating “we would concur. We have nothing to say on the record
at this time,” to the court’s proposed instruction was not invited error).
This Court’s resolution of the invited error argument in Adamcik is directly on point. It
explained:
In Blake, the district court provided the appellant with the proposed
jury instructions, and his counsel stated “[y]our honor, we would concur. We
have nothing to say on the record at this time.” The State argued that this
statement caused or prompted the district court to give the
disputed instructions and that, therefore, the invited error doctrine should preclude
the appellant from challenging these instructions on appeal. This Court disagreed,
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finding that the district court was merely giving the parties the opportunity to
object to the instructions on the record, after having already decided
which instructions to provide, and that the appellant had, therefore,
not invited any error by failing to object.
In State v. Caudill, the appellant, Caudill, argued that testimony offered by
a detective regarding a conversation the detective had previously had with the
Caudill’s codefendant violated Caudill’s Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. 109 Idaho 222, 225 (1985). This Court found that, although the
testimony in question would have constituted a violation of Caudill’s right to
confrontation, the testimony had been brought out by the question of Caudill’s
counsel, not the State. Therefore, the doctrine of invited error precluded reversal
on those grounds.
Here, Adamcik’s counsel did object to the proposed jury instructions as
they pertained to malice, though not on the grounds raised here. This was not
identical to the situation in Blake, as some minor alterations were made to the
jury instructions as a result of Adamcik’s objections, so it cannot be said that the
trial court had already reached an absolute determination as to the
exact instructions that would be offered.
However, unlike the appellant
in Blake, Adamcik did not state that he concurred with the Court’s
proposed instructions, nor did he himself request the instructions . . . . Thus, we
hold that Adamcik is not precluded by the invited error doctrine from raising this
issue on appeal, as he did not encourage the district court to offer the specific
malice instructions given, but merely failed to object.
152 Idaho at 476–77 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted or reformatted).
This case presents the same circumstances as Adamcik. Mr. Alberts did not request the
instruction at issue, nor did he fail to object when prompted by the court. See Tr., p.1100, L.25–
p.1111, L.19; Blake, 133 Idaho at 240; Skunkcap, 157 Idaho at 232. Instead, he objected to the
instruction on various grounds, later conceding that the modified instruction incorrectly stated
the law. Tr., p.1100, L.25–p.1111, L.19; Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 476–77. He never withdrew his
other objections or said that the court should give the instruction. See Tr., p.1100, L.25–p.1111,
L.19; Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 476–77. Further, the error that he now alleges on appeal is that the
instruction as a whole should not have been given because it incorrectly stated the law; he does
not argue that the modifications that he requested are what rendered the instruction erroneous.
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(App. Br., pp.15–20.) Just as in Adamcik, Mr. Alberts did not invite the court to give the
erroneous instruction. Therefore, this Court should decide the merits of his claim.

C.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Instructed The Jury That
Mr. Alberts Could Not Have Acted In Self-Defense If He Intentionally Put Himself In A
Situation Where He Knew Or Believed He Would Have To Act In Self-Defense
On the merits of Mr. Alberts’ argument, the State argues that the instruction correctly

stated the law, and that any error is not fundamental. The State is mistaken. First, the State’s
assertion that the instruction correctly states the common law, and that common law does not
conflict with the self-defense statutes, glosses over the way in which statutes and common law
interact with one another and misconstrues both the self-defense statutes and the common law.
Second, the State, like the district court, misguidedly relies on State v. Jurko, 245 P. 685 (1926),
in an attempt to justify the instruction. Because the instruction misstated the law and amounted
to fundamental error, this Court should vacate Mr. Alberts’ judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new trial.

1.

The Instruction Conflicts With Section 18-4009, Not To Mention The Common
Law, And Thus Misstates The Law

The State claims that “[i]n addition to [the self-defense] statutory framework, there is a
longstanding common-law limitation on a defendant’s ability to claim self-defense” as provided
in the instruction (Resp. Br., p.23), and that the instruction does not “conflict with the selfdefense statute, which does not specifically address whether a defendant who intentionally seeks
out and provokes the conflict can claim” self-defense (Resp. Br., p.28; see also Resp. Br., p.32,
n.9). Not so.
This Court interprets a statute beginning with “the literal words of the statute; those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed
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as a whole.” Verska v. Saint Alphonus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011); see also
I.C. § 73-113(1) (“The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall
be given effect without engaging in statutory construction.”). If the statute is unambiguous, this
Court “simply follows the law as written.” Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Further, Idaho courts only apply common law standards to gaps in the
Idaho Code; they do not apply the common law to matters covered by statutory law. I.C. § 73116 (“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the
constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is
the rule of decision in all courts of this state.”) (emphasis added).
Section 18-4009 provides:
Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person in either of the following
cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to
do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who
manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering
violence to any person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or husband,
parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such person, when there is reasonable
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily
injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person,
or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant or
engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to
apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any
riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
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By drafting section 18-4009, the Idaho Legislature has spoken on the issue of self-defense and
thus there is no “gap” in the Idaho Code for the common law of self-defense to fill. And because
section 18-4009 “does not specifically address whether a defendant who intentionally seeks out
and provokes the conflict can claim” self-defense, such circumstances are wholly irrelevant to a
defendant’s claim of self-defense. (Resp. Br., p.28.) To conclude otherwise would require this
Court to read something into the statute which simply is not there, plainly at odds with the rules
of statutory construction.

See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893; I.C. §§ 73-113(1), 73-116.

The

instruction conflicts with the plain language of section 18-4009, and thus it incorrectly states the
law.
Further, the State’s claim that the instruction embodies “a longstanding common-law
limitation on a defendant’s ability to claim self-defense” overlooks significant differences
between the instruction here and its supposed common law roots.

The district court here

instructed the jury that:
One cannot claim the benefits of self-defense if he intentionally put himself where
he knew or believed he would have to invoke its aid. If you believe from the
evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant sought a meeting
with the deceased for the purpose of provoking a difficulty with the deceased, or
with the intent to take the life of the deceased or to do him such serious bodily
injury as might result in death, then the Defendant would not be permitted to
justify on the ground of self-defense, even though he should thereafter have been
compelled to act in his own defense. . . .
(R., p.226 (emphasis added).)

In other words, this instruction precludes a defendant from

claiming self-defense if he merely put himself in a situation where he believes he may need to
defend himself or if he sought a verbal confrontation with the deceased. 2 That is a far cry from

2

The State faults Mr. Alberts for misframing the issue in his appellant’s brief. (Resp.
Br., pp.26–27.) It claims that Mr. Alberts narrowly focused on one phrase of the instruction—
that “one cannot claim its benefits after he has intentionally put himself where he knows or
believes he will have to invoke its aid”—and it exalts a latter part of the instruction as drawing “a
14

the smattering of doctrines on which the State relies.

(Resp. Br., pp.29–30.)

It is not

“produc[ing] the occasion in order to have a pretext for killing [an] adversary,” State v.
Domingue, 118 So. 46, 48 (La. 1928) (emphasis added); “intentionally provok[ing] a difficulty in
order to have a pretext to kill,” State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 510 (Me. 1971) (emphasis added);
seeking “the difficulty with the deceased for the purpose of chastising or beating him,” Gibson v.
State, 8 So. 98, 100 (Ala. 1890) (emphasis added); committing “deliberate and lawless acts” or
“bantering [the victim] to a fight for the purpose of taking his life,” Adams v. People, 47 Ill. 376,
379–80 (1868) (emphasis added); or “provok[ing] a quarrel, and tak[ing] advantage of it, and
then justify[ing] the homicide,” State v. Ballou, 40 A. 861, 863 (R.I. 1898) (emphasis added). It
is not the same as precluding a claim of self-defense when the defendant “was reckless or
negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils,” JUSTIFICATION
GENERALLY: CHOICE OF EVILS, Model Penal Code § 3.02 (emphasis added)3; or the same as the
requirement that a defendant who “seeks or induces the quarrel which leads to the necessity for
killing his adversary . . . first decline to carry on the affray and must honestly endeavor to escape
from it” in order to raise self-defense, People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 66 (1944). In short, the
State’s discussion of the instruction’s supposed common-law roots glosses over the most

far smaller category of persons” which Mr. Alberts falls within—those defendants who “sought a
meeting with the deceased for the purpose of provoking a difficulty with said deceased, or with
the intent to take the life of the said deceased or to do him such serious bodily injury as might
result in death.” (Id.) This is a misrepresentation of Mr. Alberts’ argument, as he specifically
challenged the “sought a meeting” clause of the instruction. (See, e.g., App. Br., p.20.) Further,
far from saving the instruction, this clause is in fact a death knell. Merely seeking a meeting to
provoke a difficulty does not take self-defense off of the table under Idaho law or common law.
See I.C. § 18-4009; infra, pp.15–17.
3
Regardless, the more relevant provision of the Model Penal Code, titled “Use of Force in SelfProtection,” does not preclude a claim of self-defense when the defendant either sought out a
verbal confrontation or placed himself in the situation requiring that he defend himself.
Model Penal Code § 3.04.
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axiomatic distinction between the instruction here and the authorities on which the State relies:
the district court instructed the jury that Mr. Alberts could not claim self-defense if he simply put
himself in a situation where he believed he would need to act in self-defense or sought a
confrontation, verbal or otherwise, with Mr. Warren. (R., p.226.) The instruction is inconsistent
with both the common law and section 18-4009, and thus incorrectly stated the law.

2.

The Jurko Decision Does Not Justify The District Court’s Decision To Give The
Instruction

In response to Mr. Alberts’ argument that the district court mistakenly relied on State v.
Jurko, 245 P. 685 (1926), when deciding to give the instruction at issue (App. Br., pp.18–19), the
State asserts that Mr. Alberts has not argued or shown that Jurko should be overruled as
manifestly incorrect (Resp. Br., p.28). Although Mr. Alberts did not explicitly ask this Court to
overrule Jurko, he opened his discussion by explaining that the district court incorrectly relied on
that decision because Jurko looked to an Oregon case, not Idaho Code, when condoning the
instruction. (App. Br., p.18.) Therefore, Jurko does not control here. Instead, this Court’s
decision in State v. Livesay, 71 Idaho 442, 446 (1951), dictates the outcome in this case. There,
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a similar instruction after Livesay argued that the instruction
erroneously precluded her from claiming self-defense if she intentionally put herself where she
knew or believed she would need to act in self-defense. (App. Br., p.19.) Likewise, the district
court here erroneously instructed the jury that Mr. Alberts could not claim self-defense if he
merely put himself in a situation where he believed he may need to defend himself or if he
sought a verbal confrontation with the deceased. (R., p.226.)
Relatedly, the State takes issue with Mr. Alberts’ argument that Jurko does not apply here
because Jurko argued that the instruction misstated the first aggressor rule and did not challenge
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the language which takes self-defense off of the table if the defendant seeks a confrontation or
intentionally puts himself in a position where he may need to defend himself. (Resp. Br., pp.32–
33.) The State asserts that, because the Court explicitly considered all of the instructions
together when concluding the instruction was proper, that “necessarily shows the particular
instruction at issue did not misstate the law of self-defense.” (Resp. Br., p.33.) The State is
incorrect. Had the Jurko Court actually considered the argument Mr. Alberts has made here, it
very well could have reached the same conclusion that it reached twenty-five years after Jurko in
Livesay: “Bare intent and purpose to provoke a difficulty does not deprive one of the right of
self defense. He must do some act or something at the time of the difficulty that does provoke
the same.” 71 Idaho at 448.
In sum, the district court misstated the law when it instructed the jury that individuals
who seek out a meeting with someone, knowing or believing that that meeting could end badly,
cannot claim self-defense. The instruction amounted to fundamental error because it lowered the
State’s burden of proof and thus violated Mr. Alberts’ unwaived constitutional right to due
process, the error is plain on the face of the record, and there is a reasonable possibility that the
error affected the outcome of the trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above and in his appellant’s brief, Mr. Alberts respectfully asks
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case to the district court for a
new trial.
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